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Hungary has about ten years history of pension privatization process and the 
Hungarian experience could be really instructive. This paper is focused on the 
supplementary pensions trying to prove that no kind of reform of state pension 
system is able to solve all the problems of insufficient pensions. The paper 
highlights the main factors what could exetr  an influence on the  level of 
supplementary pensions. Some basic characteristics of the Hungarian private 
pension market are presented by means of empirical data and a complex measure 
of efficiency of pension fund operations is calculated. 
 
JEL :  G23  Pension Funds, Other Private Financial Institutions  
 
1. Need for a common language 
 
Many problems derived from some kind of mis-interpretation of the special pension 
concepts.  Some important definitions should be commonly accepted because 
sometimes the same things are called with different names or inversely the same 
words are used for different things.   
 
The clear understanding of the following words and expressions is very important in 
order to explain also the main features of the Hungarian pension system.  
 
Pension plans (pension schemes) 
According to a OECD paper (see References [ ] 1 ) the definition is given as follow: “A 
legally binding contract, an implicit agreement as part of a broader contract (e.g. 
employment contract), or a tax qualified savings or retirement programme designed   2 
to provide the plan's beneficiaries (including members) with an  income after 
retirement. The plan must therefore have an explicit retirement objective, or - in 
order to satisfy tax related conditions or contract provisions - the benefits cannot be 
paid at all or without a significant penalty unless the beneficiary is older than a 
legally defined retirement age. Pension plans may offer additional benefits, such as 
disability, sickness, and survivors' benefits.”  
On the basis of the definition above we could call as pension plan (or scheme) any 
legally regulated arrangements that are projected to provide income after 
retirement. According to this understanding there are three different  types of 
pension schemes in Hungary:  
1.  Publicly managed, Mandatory Pension Scheme, generally called as Social 
Security Pension Scheme (SSPS).  Participation and contribution is legally 
regulated, and it is mandatory for all employees. Contributions are paid both by 
employees and employers. It is financed in a pay-as-you-go system  
2.  Privately managed, funded Pension schemes with mandatory contributions. 
Participation is mandatory for young people of starting their carrier and this 
scheme is partially substitution to the SSPS, as the contribution to this scheme 
reduces the mandatory contribution paid into SSPS. The membership in this type 
of scheme automatically resulted in reduced pension promise of SSPS. Only 
employees pay mandatory contributions
1  to this scheme, but employers and 
employees are allowed to pay also some additional voluntary contributions
2. This 
scheme is a defined contribution system with very limited guarantees.  
3.  Privately managed, funded Pension schemes with voluntary contributions, where 
participation is also voluntary. Pension provisions provided by these schemes are 
supplementary to the SSPS.  Minimum contribution is regulated by the special 
rules of institutions providing pension provisions. Contributions could be paid 
both employers and employees. All these schemes are defined contributions 
without guarantees. Tax allowances are available both on contributions (up to a 
limited amount of contributions) and services provided by the schemes.   
                                                 
1 Iin 2004 the mandatory contribution payable to this scheme is 8% of the pensionable income.   
2 The voluntary contribution to the mandatory private funds could be of a maximum of 2% of the pensionable 
income.    3 
Occupational Pension Schemes  
The possible definition of the occupational pension schemes  [ ] 1  is as follows: 
“ Access to occupational plans is linked to an employment relationship. The plans are 
organised and possibly administered by employers, industry associations, and the 
employment or professional association representing a group of individuals for the 
employees or members of that relevant entity that sponsors the plan. In these plans, 
the plan sponsor has other responsibilities in addition to paying contributions to the 
pension plan. Its involvement may include negotiating the design of the plan with 
the plan provider/administrator (e.g. an insurance company). “  
Occupational pension schemes, which are included in employment contracts, are not 
typical in Hungary. Only a small part of employers undertakes any commitment to 
pay voluntary contributions into a scheme, and there is really exceptional when the 
employer takes any other responsibilities than paying contributions.  
The main reason of the absence of the occupational schemes derives from the 
economic environment. First, in the transition period the employers of the Eastern 
European countries were not forced to set up any comprehensive benefit system. 
The high level of unemployment, and the short-run thinking on profitability of 
investors naturally resulted in the lack of social empathy. Second reason of the less 
importance of the occupational schemes in Hungary, or generally in Eastern Europe 
is the fact, that the low level of salaries comparing to the high price level results in a 
clear preference of  employees towards immediate incomes rather the deferred 
incomes. The next possible explanation of the absence of occupational schemes 
could be that the concept of occupational schemes itself is missing from the concept 
of the pension reform itself. The role of employers was not clearly expressed and 
employers had no special advantages in case of establishment of their own pension 
schemes. 
On the other side, the possibility to set up occupational pension schemes is not 
really precluded from the Hungarian regulation. Some employers, mainly those 
owned by big international companies having global benefit strategy started to set 
up their own occupational schemes but only a few use own funds. The most 
preferred way to operate occupational schemes to pay contributions into an open 
fund.   We have some private funds that were established (and partially managed) 
by employers, but the founder employers generally did not have any long-term 
responsibilities to manage any risk of pension fund operations. (See [ ] 2 )   4 
 
Three Pillars of Pensions 
According to the well-known terminology we could say that the ongoing pension 
reform process resulted in a so-called three-pillar pension system in Hungary. The 
first pillar is the pension granted by the social security. The second pillar consists of 
pensions paid by the mandatory private pension funds that are built up from 
mandatory contributions determined as a the ratio of pensionable incomes.  The 
third pillar  includes pensions that are provided against the pension fund 
contributions or insurance fees paid voluntarily by the insured person or his/her 
employer. 
 
But the meaning of the three pillars of pensions could have different interpretations: 
According to the common wording of the EU pension directives, the first pillar is the 
pension provided by the state, the second is the occupational schemes deriving 
directly from employment contracts and the third one is the so-called personal 
pension when people realising that the other pillars would not be able to provide 
satisfactory pensions to insure their old-age income.  Confusing this distinction 
could result in some mis-understanding of the explanations in the comparative 
pension studies.[ ] 4  
 
Pension Fund  
The definition of pension fund  [ ] 1  says that it is “ a pool of assets consisting 
exclusively of the contributions to a pension plan and the income earned on them” 
but sometimes the financial vehicles itself are mentioning as pension funds. Perhaps 
the most mis-interpretations of the Hungarian private pension system came from 
this double meaning of pension funds. If we take into consideration that the meaning 
of “investment funds“ is clear and commonly used also in Hungary, it is quite 
acceptable if we think that the “pension fund” should be something similar with the 
difference that the assets are accumulated for a special purpose, namely for 
retirement provisions. But in fact, in Hungary the new private pension institutions 
that are called as “pension funds”
3 are operating in a very different way than the 
investment funds. We could say that it is a problem of the etymology but it is quite 
important if we would like to make direct comparisons between different pension 
systems.  
                                                 
3 The official translation of the new Hungarian private pension institution is „voluntary private pension fund” (VMBF) 
and „mandatory private pension fund”(MPF) But in Hungarian it is mentioned in a  German-type name  as 
„Pensionen Kasse”    5 
 
The Hungarian private pension institutions are autonomous legal entities that were 
established as financial vehicle of private pension schemes.  They are legally own by 
the members who elect the boards of these institutions. The main governing body is 
the general assembly of the members or their delegated persons. There are no 
capital requirements to set up these institutions and the risks of operations are 
totally bear by the members. The financial returns on the reserves are directly 
credited on the individual accounts according to special accounting rules. In the 
accumulation period the individual accounts represent simply personal savings and 
the situation is very similar to that when members belong to an investment 
association, or to a mutual fund. Only at the time of retirement might members (or 
their capital on the individual accounts) become part of a veritable insurance pool, 
sharing the mortality risk. 
 
The operation of the fund is generally carried out by several appointed persons (e.g. 
a managing director, an auditor, an actuary, an investment manager, a legal expert, 
an internal inspector) and outside institutions (bank and custodian service provider 
are mandatory, while outsourcing asset management, administration, record 
keeping is optional). The funds have to meet the statutory investment, disclosure, 
reporting and accounting obligations. The funds must publish a simplified version of 
their audited annual report. State Financial Supervisory Authority supervises the 
funds as other financial firms.  
 
Contributions are divided into three parts. A certain part (in practice it is about 5-8 
percent of each contribution) covers the operational costs of the fund. About 1 -2 
percent goes into various risk and liquidity reserves and the remaining part (about 
90-94 percent of the contributions) is credited to the member’s personal account, 
which is inalienable by any third party. 
 
But these features mentioned above are not really against that we could call these 
Hungarian pension institutions as pension funds as they own and manage  “assets 
consisting exclusively of the contributions to a pension plan and the income earned 
on them “.  
  
   6 
 
2. The Development of the Private Pension Funds  
 
In Hungary the possibility to establish and operate pension funds has been available 
since 1993. First the so-called voluntary mutual benefit funds (VMBF) could be 
formed. To these voluntary pension funds – as there name shows – members enter 
on the basis of a voluntary decision and they also determine the amount of 
contributions – called membership fees – themselves.
4 
 
The voluntary private pension institutions are one of the possible institutions of self-
care for old-age security. But the self-care and the concept of pension planning 
were totally new in Hungary at the beginning of 90s because people were used to 
handle the pension as task of the state.  As a consequence the very first reactions 
were often against this new institutions as people were afraid to loose the stable 
state provision that were almost independent from the past performances of the 
pensioners. The new institutions for managing pension fund had to first gain 
people’s confidence for which the tax advantages introduced concerning voluntary 
pension contributions were very useful. 
5   
 
The new mandatory pension regulation coming into force in 1998 created the new 
type of private pension funds within the mandatory pension system, which was 
called mandatory private pension fund (MPPF)
6 .The operation of mandatory private 
pension funds is similar to the operation of voluntary funds in many aspects but the 
amount of contribution – the so-called membership fee – is prescribed by the law.  
 
In the period of 1993-1997 the development of private pension funds was rather 
slow.  Either because of the lack of information or because of distrust, but the 
essence is that the m ajority did not really know what to do with this new 
institution.[ ] 3  Even the interest of individuals who had any disposable income turned 
towards pension funds slowly. The issues of supplementary pensions were 
                                                 
4 The legal background of their operation was regulated by Act no.: XCVI. of 1993 . During the period that have 
passed since 1993 the law and the related regulations have been modified several times, which could only partly 
derived  from the  novelty of this regulation.   The frequent alterations were really harmful for the trustworthiness 
of the new institutions.   
5 50 %) of contributions paid into voluntary funds was tax deductable between 1995 and 1999. It could sometimes 
resulted in a net tax saving for people paying membership fees, since even tha highest  tax paying obligation was 
lower than the measure of the tax relief. In 2000 tax laws were modify but it remain very generous.  ( tax relief 
decreased to 30 % of payments but employer’s contributions became tax-free up to the amount of the minimal 
wage.)  
6 The Act no.: LXXXII. of 1997 on Private Pension and Private Pension Funds has been accepted by the Parliament 
on July 15, 1997.   7 
practically missing from the strategic decisions of employers as any other long-term 
strategic considerations. Practically only the tax saving opportunity motivated the 
interest that arose towards voluntary pension funds from the side both of employers 
and employees.  
 
The establishment of mandatory private pension funds as of January 1998 meant a 
real turning point. The introduction of the new mandatory pension system brought 
out merely new issues like self-care, non-state ensured pension and old-age 
existential risk. The appearance of the second pillar theoretically enforced the 
majority of employees to deal with the issue of their own pension: namely 
employees of an active age had to decide whether they want to enter into the new, 
mixed pension system or stay only in the traditional social security system. And all 
people who decided or were forced to enter the new private system also had to 
decide to which mandatory private pension fund they wish to enter. But in practice 
neither the partial contracting out of the state system nor the fund selection was not 
a real conscious action in many cases. The main problem was the non-satisfactory 
public communication and the lack of the financial culture of the people. As a 
consequence the interested persons entered the private funds practically according 
to the strength of the agents of the funds. 
 
Many people were afraid that the appearance of mandatory private pension funds 
could devalue or even disable voluntary funds. But it didn’t happen, indeed, the 
development of voluntary funds got new drive from the improvement of mandatory 
private pension funds, probably because it became more evident that the voluntary 
fund is not only a tax saving institution. Though fear was not even justified 
theoretically since the target groups of the two different pension funds were 
different: mandatory private pension funds could primarily mean an alternative 
decision for the younger generations, while entering voluntary funds was a form of 
saving worth considering for the generations closer to pension.   
 
Nowadays, practically from the beginnings of the 2000s the third period of 
development could be detected when the membership both in the voluntary and 
mandatory funds stagnates despite that there might be some more developing 
potential in the third pillar.   
   8 
But finally figures certify really convincingly (see Chart 1. and Chart 2.) that the 
Hungarian pension fund “industry” has grown up. By the end of 2002 from the 4.1 
million economically active members of the population more than 2 million entered 
into a  mandatory private pension funds. The number of members of voluntary 
private funds also exceeded 1.1 million. By the end of 2002, the assets handled by 
the whole sphere were near to HUF 365 billion (near to 2 billions of US dollar) and it 
is increasing rapidly. By the end of 2002 the reserves accumulated in the private 
pension funds represented about 5 % of the total savings of households.  
 
  Chart 1    Membership in The Private Pension Funds ín Hungary          
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3. The Market Structure of Private Pension Funds  
 
There are three typical segments of pension funds in Hungary. The biggest group of 
funds consists of funds that were established by employers or their groups.  The 
strongest group consists of funds that have financial institutions in the background 
and there are only few funds out of these two groups. At the beginning of the 
process many funds were established but only one third of the registered funds 
survived the first five years. But the termination rate was significantly different in 
the three groups of founders. The most chance for surviving could be seen in group 
of funds which have financial institutions in the background meanwhile two thirds 
(or more) of the funds established by employers has been stopped. (See Table 1.)   
 
     
    Table 1   Market Segments of the Private Pension Funds in Hungary 
  
 
A strong concentration could be detected in the market of private pension funds, 
especially in the mandatory market.  At the end of 2002 one third of the funds 
dominates more than 85% of the market and more than 60 % from the nearly 2,21 
million fund members belong to the biggest 3 funds, and these 3 funds posses 
assets that represent also about 60 % of all mandatory private pension fund assets. 
 
Concentration is slightly different in the voluntary fund market (see Chart 3.) but 
the concentration process itself is increasingly strong. The three biggest have only 
the 37% of the membership, but one third of the total number of funds 
concentrates more than 93% of members.  The 11 funds those of financial 
institutions in the background from the 82 voluntary funds operated at the end of 
Type of founders
mandatory voluntary mandatory voluntary mandatory voluntary mandatory voluntary
Financial institution 17 21 11 11 64,7% 52,4% 164 045 76 204
Employer 24 161 5 51 20,8% 31,7% 9 117 5 289
Others 19 96 2 20 10,5% 20,8% 6 806 1 941
Total 60 278 18 82 30% 29% 96 981 13 985
Number of funds 
established




(members/fund) at the 
beginning of  2003   10 
2002 united 73 % of the membership, and the assets of these 11 funds have 
reached near to 65 % of the total asset.  
 
 
       
  Chart 3  
        Market Concentration Curve of the Voluntary Pension Funds  













We have to note that the concentration of the private pension fund market is similar 
or stronger in most of the EU member states.  
 
At the beginning a relatively large number of small pension funds were founded, 
which caused a lot of arguments among professionals.  There is a viewpoint, 
according to which it was ab ovo wrong to allow the establishment of small size 
pension funds
7. The most serious argument against small pension funds was the 
uncertainty of long-term operation. These funds – practically without exception - are 
heavily person-dependant organizations that can get into deep management crises 
after the key person’s position is terminated. At the same time, the financial 
characteristic of pension funds’ activity, the necessary professional skills and the 
strict customer protection requirements all pointed to the direction, that the 
institutions established for the management of pension purpose funds cannot be 
operated with quasi-amateur management. And the micro-organizations cannot 
really ensure the necessary professional level.   
 
                                                 
7 The act allows the foundation of a voluntary pension fund with 15 persons, while in case of 
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concentration of membership asset concentration  11 
In spite of this kind of rationality there were and there are funds established with a 
few tens of members who considered the foundation of an independent pension 
fund could be the best vahicle to act for specific community interest of fund 
members. In most cases these funds were established upon the initiation and with 
the support of the employers but there are examples when natural communities 
founded small pension funds that fulfilled the technical tasks of operation by 
contracting with professional organizations and that were imagined on the basis of 
real municipalities. These small funds are able to operate only if professional service 
companies are offering expert services at competitive prices. But the current market 
climate in Hungary is not favourable for these funds that eventually – as it has been 
indicated by the figures previously – resulted in  their smaller and smaller weight in 
the pension fund market.   
 
But even now the size of voluntary
8 funds is typically small and the size distribution 
is skew. (See Table 2) Only 15 funds managed to collect more than 20.000 
members and all of these funds operate both voluntary and mandatory funds.   
 
Table 2    






4.  The Necessity of Supplementary Pensions  
 
The history of funded pensions did not start with the reform of 1990s in Hungary.
9  
There were several pension funds in Hungary also in the past but all Hungarian 
pension schemes collapsed during or after the Second World War, due to the 
damage sustained by real estate that the funds owned and to hyperinflation. As the 
only immediate solution, a unified, un-funded PAYG system was introduced around 
1950 for wage and salary earners. Initially, this covered about half the population, 
                                                 
8 We use wording of supplementary fund and voluntary fund as synonyms.  
9 More details see [ ] 6  
Size Membership 
micro less than 500  26 32% 6 027 1% 5 584 2%
small 501-5.000 30 37% 52 770 5% 26 653 8%
medium 5.001-50.000 19 23% 365 695 32% 134 338 38%
large more than 50.000 7 9% 722 305 63% 184 619 53%
82 1 146 797 351 193
Funds Members Assets (millions HUF )   12 
but the coverage and range of benefits were gradually extended. By the mid-1970s, 
the system was approaching maturation, with almost 100 per cent coverage and a 
comprehensive range of old age, survivors’ and disability benefits.  
 
Expansion of the system, rising wages and retirement by successive cohorts with 
entitlements from increasing numbers of years of employment raised the proportion 
of aggregate pension expenditure (including all disability benefits) to GDP from 3.5 
per cent in 1970 to 6.9 per cent in 1980 and 8.8 per cent in 1990. By the late 1970s, 
the system was under increasing strain from problems of rising wages and prices. 
Pension increases were inadequate and sporadic, so that only the lowest pensions 
kept pace with wages and inflation, while medium-sized and higher pensions were 
steadily eroded, at first only relative to wages, but later in real terms, relative to 
prices.  
 
The transition period created even more difficult situation. The fall in employment 
was decreasing the number of contributors while the number of pensioners was 
increasing sharply, as many employees close to the statutory retirement age were 
sent into early retirement or volunteered for it. Thus the system dependency ratio—
the ratio of the number of pensioners to the number of contributors—jumped from 
51.4 per cent in 1989 to 83.9 percent in 1996.  
 
Several measures were introduced in order to handle the problems within the 
existing system that restored the immediate financial viability of the pension system, 
but they did not improve the microeconomic transparency or the fairness of the 
system. If anything, they went against equity among retiring cohorts, by making 
individual pensions strongly dependent on inflation-rate fluctuations in the years 
preceding retirement, and weakened confidence in the ability of old-age pensions to 
provide income security. Furthermore, anxieties persisted about the projected 
increase in the old-age demographic dependency ratio from 2020 onwards.  
 
The prime inadequacy of the existing system was its design. It embodied an almost 
impenetrable mix of social assistance (solidarity through redistribution) and social 
insurance (partial but fair replacement of previous income, based on contributions). 
Pensioners had little idea why their pensions were exactly what they were or how 
they related to their previous contributions. 
   13 
To summarize, the pension system as a whole did not collapse during the 
transitional economic crisis. It continued to give albeit meagre support to 
pensioners and on average to sustain equity between the working and retired 
generation: at least until 1996, the real values of the average pension and the 
average wage sank in parallel. The system favoured the poorest pensioners at the 
expense of those with higher previous incomes and longer service. The system had 
become gradually too complex, illogical and unattractive. Citizens had decreasing 
incentives to contribute properly to its financing, at a time of increasing 
opportunities to evade contributions through the so-called black and grey economies.  
 
By 1995, it was generally agreed among experts and politicians that a 
comprehensive reform was necessary. There should be a new pension system that 
created strong personal incentives for earners to pay contributions.  
 
Two essential requirements for this were fair calculation and individual  record 
keeping. The ideas about how to achieve these goals, however, differed 
fundamentally. After long debates the main concept of the blueprint advanced by 
the Ministry of Finance was introduced. This blueprint concentrated on introducing a 
mandatory, private, funded scheme, while largely neglecting the internal systemic 
problems of the public scheme. The contribution-related, public PAYG system was 
sustained, so that the privatization was only partial. The expectations of the plan’s 
proponents were along the lines of the World Bank’s argument. It was to foster 
economic growth, deepen capital markets, and for pensioners, produce returns on 
capital higher than the internal rate of return in the PAYG system. Additionally, 
there was emphasis on the advantage of putting one’s eggs in two baskets (splitting 
risks between two pension schemes). 
 
The reform offered a choice to those already employed. They could either remain 
full members of the SSPS or join an MPPF (Mandatory Private Pension Fund) of their 
choice, while retaining membership of the SSPS with diminished contributions and 
pension rights. (Exclusive membership of an MPPF was not an option.) Those who 
opted for membership of the latter solution, known as the MS (Mixed System), 
surrendered 25 per cent of the pension rights that had accrued to them hitherto in 
the SSPS. No alternative was offered to new entrants to the labour market, for 
whom the MS became compulsory, implying that in the very long run, the Mixed 
System would become universal.    14 
 
One of the most important changes in social security pension is that a new pension 
formula was introduced. The after-reform pension 
10 could be calculated according 
to a plain formula:  Years in service multiplied by average annual pensionable 
earnings multiplied by a  pension multiplier. The pension multiplier is 1.22% for 
participants of MS and 1.65% for others. It means that pension promises of the 
SSPS for persons in MS is about 25% less than those who did not join to an MPPF. 
But in theory they will get a part of their pension from these MPPFs.  
 
The Hungarian pension reformers argued for the new system by estimating about 2 
percent real rate of return and they asserted that only for people under age 40 
might be advised to join the new (mixed) system. After more than 25 years of 
accumulation in the private pillar and at a projected real rate of return above 2 
percent, the pension expectation is higher for people who get pensions from both 
the public and the private mandatory pillar. However, there are no built-in 
protections in the system for the case when the effective performance would be 
worse. The final decision on the two-pillar system was not really aimed at targeting 
significantly higher pensions but at achieving other goals. Interestingly, at higher 
levels of income the projections of relative replacement rates from the two types of 
pension systems are not significantly different (see Chart4)
11   
 
Looking at the Chart 4 on pension promises of the Hungarian Mandatory Pension 
System we have to realize that above the cap of pensionable income the pension 
substitution rate (initial pension as a percentage of the final income) is decreasing 
sharply and above the level of annual income of 25 thousands of EURO
12 the 
expectable substitution is less than 40% percent. It means that the pension 
substitution could be called satisfactory only at the very low level of income. But at 
a low level of income even a higher level of pension would not be satisfactory to 
maintain the former living standard. People of higher income are generally know 
                                                 
10 The reform has left the public old-age pension scheme practically unchanged or postponed 
corrections in it until around 2010. Rules of eligibility and measures concerning old-age 
entry (first) pensions, received in the beneficiary’s own right, have been sustained with a 
few minor exceptions. The new pension promises will be in force only after 2010. 
11 In this calculation the tax and contribution rules are considered according to the 
legislation valid in 2003. We assume that the cap of the pensionable income increases with 
inflation (In 2003  the maximum of the pensionable income was cc 15000 EURO/year).We 
calculate with 2% of real income growth during the contributing period.  
12 25000 EURO is less than the average income in the present member state of European 
Union.     15 
very well even now, that they could not expect satisfactory pension from the 
mandatory system. But it is not sure that they also have realized the need to 
protect themselves from the drastic fall of their income in time of retirement.  
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As a consequence it could have been highly advisable for people to learn that there 
is a clear need for supplementary pension savings practically at any income level.  
 
But the facts show that only very few interested persons realized this and the 
present level of contributions does not give good chance for satisfactory 
supplementary pensions provided by the voluntary funds in Hungary. 
 
To explain the statement above we are going to consider some elements of the 
effectiveness of the voluntary pension funds in Hungary   
 
 
Years ín service 40    Contributing to MPF : 40 years    ROI in real term 2%   16 
5.  The Results of the Supplementary Pension System in Hungary  
 
 
If we would like to estimate the expectable pensions provided by the supplementary 
funds we should take into consideration the factors that might affect the final 
outcome of the system. In this case the factors could be summarise as it follows: 
How many interested people are participating, how many contributions they pay and 




As it was previously mentioned the voluntary private pension funds started their 
operation only in 1993 and voluntary pension savings could have been accumulated 
in institutionally regulated way only since then. The operation of voluntary funds 
was supported by significant tax measures. Paying contribution was tax favoured 
both for employers and the individuals. As a result by the end of 2002 the number 
of members of voluntary funds has reached about one quarter of the number of the 
population in active age.  
 
To judge whether the participation could be called satisfactory or not is a bit 
ambiguous. The membership itself is impressive. We have to take into consideration 
also that decades of state paternalism diminished the general acceptance of 
necessity of self-care. It could means that the high level of membership is a good 
signal of changing mind.  But we should realize the role of employers: in 2002 on an 
average about 70% of total contributions were paid by employers. In more than 
55% of funds the share of employers’ contribution is higher than 80%. It means 
that a lot of member joint to the voluntary funds only because they wanted to get 
the employers’ contributions. Some or more of them is probably going to withdraw 
their accumulated capital form the fund as soon as it is possible.
13  
At the same time multiple membership is allowed in the supplementary pension 
schemes. It means that the effective number of fund member might be really lower 
with about 10-15%.  
                                                 
13 After 10 years of waiting period the benefit reserves could be withdrawn but the payments 





Satisfactory pensions could be likely only in case of appropriate level of 
contributions. But the level of contribution paid into the supplementary funds in 
Hungary could hardly be called appropriate for satisfactory level of pensions. 
 
In 2002 the average contribution (the total sum of contributions paid into voluntary 
pension funds divided by the total number of members) was less than 200 
EURO/year.
14  The average contributions are especially low at the big funds. It could 
be a consequence of that these funds often paid high commissions for new entrance 




Distribution of the Average Annual Voluntary Pension Contributions  
  
 
 This low level of contribution might be explained that the most participant use the 
pension funds as tax saving institutions and they practically do not mind the pension 
expectations. Probably only few interested persons know that their projected 
supplementary pension would be lower than 1.000 EURO/year
15 (in real term) if 
they continue to contribute in the current level.  According to the figures showed by 
the Table 3, more than 75% of members belong to those funds where such kind of 
pension level might be estimated on the basis of the current level of average 
contributions over a period of 30 years.  
 
The level of contribution is derived also from the low level of income and the lack of 
disposable income. As a comparison we could see the level of contributions in the 
                                                 
14 Of course the level of contribution can not be seen independently from the length of the 
accumulation period.  The age distribution of voluntary funds is varying from fund to fund,  
but as an average we could say that the future accumulation period of the present members  
is less then 20 years.  
15 1000 EURO is less than 50% of the monthly minimum income in Europe.  
  >1000  501-1000  251-500  101-250  100> 
3  16  22  37  4 
members of funds in the group (in ths)        1        53        230        730       167 
0%  4%  19%  62%  14% 
average annual contribution to the fund   
(in  EURO)  
number of funds    18 
mandatory funds where the contribution level is compulsory
16 and we realise that 
there is no real difference in the contribution level between the two segments of the 
private pensions in spite of the fact that the level of contribution is not limited by 
law in the voluntary funds.  (See Chart 5)  
 
CHART 5 
Average Monthly Contributions to the Private Pension Funds in Hungary 
Our finding is that the voluntary contribution has no upward trends mainly because 
the limits of tax incentives remained unchanged during the period investigated. The 




Administrative charges in the Voluntary Private Pension Funds could be proportional 
to contributions and proportional to the value of assets.  
 
The front load fee, that is the charges proportional to contributions is levelled by the 
market as the biggest funds sometimes argued for members saying that they 
charge less front load fee than others. But it was not a healthy competition as the 
real cost of operation – especially at the starting period - was often far more than it 
could be covered by the front load fees. The funds could start and develop their 
operations only with strong financial support of their background institutions.  In 
case of open fund the supporting institutions took this kind of financial supports as 
                                                 






























Average Mandatory contributions  19 
an investment in order to keep the future asset management service. By now these 
supporters realise good profits from the asset management fees charged by them 
for the funds.  
 
The typical measure of charges proportional to contributions is 5%. Only some 
closed funds charge significantly fewer (sometimes no when employer pays the 
operational costs) and some open fund charge up to 10% trying to cover  all the 
costs of operations.   
 
In spite of the fact that the charges proportional to contributions are levelled there 
are significant differences among funds how much costs they use for their 
operations. (See Chart 6)  The funds sometimes cover these costs above their 
charges on contributions with direct or indirect financial support of their founders. At 
the starting period these financial supports had important role in coverage of 
operational costs but nowadays the big funds have become self-supporting 
organisations. To have a chance for comparisons between administrative cost and 
costs connected to the asset management activities we should measure the 
administrative charges also as a percentage of assets measured. ( See Chart 7 )  
 
Chart 6 
Costs of Operations in the VMBFs in Hungary  2002   
 
The biggest 15 funds all operate with a cost of less than 4500 HUF/member/year 
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is far more in the smaller funds. On the other s ide, in the fund of the most 
expensive operation ( where the annual per capita cost of operation is above 10.000 
HUF) is  even far cheaper than the average annaul cost of a bank account in a 
Hungarian registered bank, meantime tha administrative obligations of a fund is far 




Costs of Operations as a Percentage of Asset Value of Funds in 2002   
 
 
The charges proportional to the asset value were significantly different in the funds. 
(See Chart 8) The highest costs proportional to the asset value
17 can be observed  
in the funds of financial institutions in the background , namely in the biggest funds. 
That is somehow against the economic of scale. But previously we mentioned that 
at the same time these funds are managed with relatively low operational costs. We 
should consider that the different level of total management costs could be realized 
in different structures of charges.   
 
To make real comparisons between funds, it is reasonable to investigate the total 
management cost as a whole. This comparison could be also reasonable if we would 
                                                 
17 Costs proportional to the asset value consist of the fees paid for asset management and 








0% 0,15% 0,25% 0,35% 0,45% 0,55% 0,65% 0,75% 0,85% 0,95% 1,05% 1,15% 1,25% 1,35% 1,45% 1,55% 1,65% 1,75%















s  21 
like to compare the management costs of pension funds and other kind of 
investment fund where the total costs are charged generally as a percent of the 
asset value.  The sum of the charges proportional to contributions and the asset 
value  could be called as total management cost.  In 2002 the total management 
costs of voluntary funds in Hungary as a percentage of the total asset value was 
1,98% what is a reasonable cost level. If we take the funds individually we could 
find that less than 10% of the funds is managed with a cost of more than 3%. But 
the economic of scale does not work again: the total management costs of the 
bigger funds are not really less than that of the smaller ones. (See Table 4) Only the 
very tiny funds of less than 1000 members seem to be significantly more expensive 
than others.  
 
Chart 8 
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Fund opearted by financial institutions Fund of employers  Open fund with competitive asset management  22 
 
Table 4  





The Hungarian supplementary pension funds are funded schemes of defined 
contributions. As a consequence, the level of pensions depends very much of the 
real rate of return of investments. (See Chart 9). The same level of contributions 
could result in very different pensions due to the effective returns on investments. 
According to a rough estimation in case of 4% of real rate of return the pension 
expectation is about doubled in a period of 30 years of accumulation comparing to 
that case when the real rate of return is only 0%. This means that we have to pay 
high attention to the investment performances.   
 
The history of Hungarian supplementary is not too long. At the same time, the 
developing period of the capital market in Hungary made the investment measures 
also a bit dubious if we take into consideration all the data from the very beginning 
period of the funds’ operation.  But the latest five years might give us some 
valuable information. 
 
The first finding is that the average performances of teh latest 5-years are very 
much diverse. (See Chart 10) The mean of average real returns is 2,3% which is 
not too high but acceptable.  But the standard deviation is close to the level of mean. 
It means that the fund selection had quite an important role in what size of benefit 


























above 100.000 2 148 612      32 105 1,3% 1,0% 2,3% 2 995 2 198 5 194
50.000-100.000 4 83 447      17 398 1,4% 1,3% 2,8% 3 001 2 522 5 523
10.000-50.000 14 26 813      8 105 1,2% 0,8% 2,0% 3 643 2 070 5 713
1.000-10.000 24 3 444      1 534 1,1% 0,6% 1,7% 4 479 2 447 6 926
below 1.000 34 393       221 1,4% 0,6% 2,0% 12 480 4 485 16 965
TOTAL  78      262 708      59 363 1,3% 0,9% 2,2% 3 324 2494 5 818








as a percentage of                             
assets manged  23 
Chart 9 




The first natural explanation could be the different investment policy of the funds 
but it is not the real case. Of course there are differences in the portfolios but these 
are not explanatory enough.  The portfolio of almost all the funds consists of more 
than 75-80% of state bonds or other domestic bonds with some guarantee and the 
risky assets are generally below 10%.  As a consequence the investment policy 
could hardly give satisfactory explanation on the very different investment 
performances. 
 
Chart 10  
Average of Real Rate of Returns on Investments of Assets of VMBFs  
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Average Annual Real Rate of Return in the period of 1998-2002 
number of funds
    X  =     2,3%
STD =    2.0%
      N =   82   24 
 
If we are looking for some other explanatory factors we should note that there are 
significant differences in the performance of funds of different way of asset 
management. Some funds works in–house asset management. The  regulation is 
rather week concerning the in-house asset management: It requires qualified 
experts employed by the funds but there is no capital requirement. In case of in-
house asset management the funds’ managers should take the responsibility of 
investment activity which is generally far out of their competencies. Because of this 
fact most fund decided to outsource the asset management. The financial 
institutions which established funds generally have their own investment institutions 
and the main reasons of the establishment was even to acquire this asset 
management service.  As a result – in spite of the fact that according to the 
legislation the funds have to call for tender in order to select the asset manager(s) - 
there is no any fund with financial i nstitutions in the background which use other 
asset managers than their only asset manager company in the same financial group. 
In theory it could be natural and even have more rationality.  But the lack of the 
market competition in the selection process could be harmful.  We suspect that it 
could be one of the possible explanations of the differences of investment 
performances. (See Table 5)  
 
Table 5  
Investment Performances of the Groups of Hungarian VMBFs  
in the Period of 1998-2002 
 
We should not forget that even the largest funds belong to the group of funds of 
non-competing asset management. It means that many members belong to the 






15 76 22% 209 18% 3,4% -1,7% 7,4%
Competing outsourced asset management 56 97 28% 262 23% 2,2% -1,2% 5,6%
Non-competing outsoursed asset management11 178 51% 676 59% 1,2% -2,8% 3,6%
Total 82 351 100% 1 147 100% 2,3% -2,8% 7,4%
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6.  Internal Efficiency of Ptrivate Pension Fund Operations 
 
The voluntary pension funds are basically one of the possible financial vehicles for 
pension savings.  In this context the efficiency of the pension savings could be 
measured in a way of financial effectiveness which means that in order to measure  
the internal efficiency we should consider all the money put into the system within 
the period investigated and the final claims of the members at the end of the period.  
 
The internal efficiency could be measured on individual level, on fund level and also 
on the level of the whole system. The method is very similar, but the Cash-in-flows, 
Cash-out-flows and the final outcome should be differently defined.  
 
a)  On individual level the cash in-flow is the contribution what was paid, as a 
benefit of a member. In practice
18 there is no out-flow in the accumulation 
period.  The final outcome is the market value of the personal account of the 
member at the end of the period.   
 
Let us suppose that a member paid the same sum (in this example 100.000 
HUF/year) into a voluntary f und between 1995 and 2003. The balance 
available on his personal account at the end of the period depends on the 
charges proportional to contributions and the net rate of returns on 
investments which was credited on his account.
19  Table 7 illustrates the 
calculation
20 in case of 5% of charges proportional to contributions and 1% 
real ROI.   
 
We should consider the influence of the front load fees and the investment 
performances on the individual internal efficiency. ( See Table 8 )   First we 
should realize  that taken into consideration the tax allowances on the 
contributions the payments into voluntary pension funds were very good 
investments on individual level. On the other side we could see that charges of 
5% proportional to contribution could be balanced with 1% positive real rate of 
return in order to retain the value of money paid in.  If front load fee increases 
                                                 
18 Members are allowed to ask member’s loan but it was not typical in the period 
investigated.  
19 In the previous chapter we could see that both of the two factors was very much different 
among the funds. 
20 In the rough calculations we suppose that all the contributions were paid in the end of the 
year. If data are available more sophisticated calculations could be done.    26 
with 1% of contributions the value of the personal accounts (namely the benefit 
reserves) has changed also about 1% in the period investigated. But changes of 
1% in real rate of return resulted in changes of about 5% of final outcome of the 
system. As a consequence, in this period of 9 years (which is not a long one for 
pension savings) in a fund of good performance the balances of individual 
accounts could be higher with about 50% than in the worse fund of having the 
same contribution structure.  
Table 7 
Calculation of  Empirical Internal Efficiency of Pension Fund Operations 
In Hungary in the period of 1995-2003 
 
 
Table 8  
Individual Internal Efficiency of Hungarian Voluntary Pension Funds in 



















the end of 
the period 
(ths HUF)  
Accuont 
value  as a 
percentage 
of the basis 
case 
95%  3%  22,8%  11,1%  1 581  100% 
89%  3%  21,5%  9,8%  1 482  94% 
94%  3%  22,6%  10,9%  1 565  99% 
99%  3%  23,7%  11,9%  1 649  104% 
95%  -3%  17%  5%  1 180  75% 
95%  0%  20%  8%  1 366  86% 
95%  6%  26%  14%  1 833  116% 
    Supposed Annaul contribution :  100Ths of HUF    
 
 
Charges proportional to contributions 5%
















Value of the 
personal 
account at 
the end of 
the year
Personal 
Cash Flow  
Cash Flow  
with tax 
allowances
1995 28% 50% 100 000 245 341 29% 108 870 -100 000 -50 000
1996 24% 50% 100 000 198 496 25% 242 337 -100 000 -50 000
1997 18% 50% 100 000 167 790 19% 393 276 -100 000 -50 000
1998 14% 50% 100 000 146 798 15% 555 714 -100 000 -50 000
1999 10% 30% 100 000 133 453 11% 717 068 -100 000 -50 000
2000 10% 30% 100 000 121 542 11% 894 641 -100 000 -70 000
2001 9% 30% 100 000 111 302 10% 1 085 740 -100 000 -70 000
2002 5% 30% 100 000 105 700 6% 1 252 134 -100 000 -70 000
2003 6% 30% 100 000 100 000 7% 1 434 209 -100 000 -70 000
Total 900 000 1 330 423 1 434 209 1 434 209
average weighted by assets 9,2% 10,2%
 Internal Rate of Return on Contributions 9,2% 20,8%
*Hungarian National Bank, Annaul average  27 
b)  The internal efficiency rate of funds could be a complex measure to compare 
the performances of the funds. This measure would be suitable to make 
classes of efficiency and could have been calculated according to the data of 
the annual reports by the supervisory agency or any other independent 
parties and it could be published in order to help the transparency.  But in 
this moment the data required for this kind of comparative studies are not 
available for public.  
 
Measuring the internal efficiency on fund level would have required time 
series of data of total sum of payments for members paid into the fund in a 
year and all the payments delivered by the fund to the members.  The 
outcome could be measured as a value of benefit reserve of the fund at the 
end of the period. If the internal efficiency would have been measured in a 
special period the initial value of the relevant Cash flow should be the market 
value of the benefit reserves of the fund at the beginning of the period. 
21  
As an illustration Table 9 show the calculation for two funds. In this example 
the figures shows that Fund I. had better performance in the period of 1998-
2000 than the Fund II. 
 
      Table 9  
      Two Examples for Calculation of Internal Efficiency of Funds  
 
                                                 
21 The signs of the element of the relevant Cash Flow should be determined as appropriate.  
 
Net CF
Market value of 
benefit reserves 
at the end of the 
year
Relevant CF for the 
period of 1998-2002
FUND I: 0
1995 18 716 700 19 959 000
1996 21 328 721 47 524 000
1997 27 404 924 89 326 000 89 326 000
1998 26 700 000 145 862 000 26 700 000
1999 33 428 755 197 110 000 33 428 755
2000 47 506 383 265 604 000 47 506 383
2001 88 525 646 365 064 000 88 525 646
2002 59 036 822 480 609 000 -421 572 178 13,4% IRR
FUND II:
1997 703 750 574 703 750 574
1998 478 963 397 1 278 566 142 478 963 397
1999 532 751 232 2 078 622 861 532 751 232
2000 726 340 716 2 981 709 551 726 340 716
2001 875 924 389 4 124 085 589 875 924 389
2002 889 723 927 5 405 346 198 -4 515 622 271 11,1% IRR  28 
  
c)  Finally the internal efficiency could be calculated also at sector level. In this 
case the initial value of the relevant CF would be the total amount of market 
values of the benefit reserves of each fund at the beginning of the period 
investigated. All annual CF would be calculated as the sum of annual net CF 
of each fund.   And the outcome would be the total amount of market values 
of the benefit reserves of each fund at the end of the period investigated.  
 
 By means of this measure we could compare for example the efficiency of 
the mandatory and the voluntary systems or we could follow the dynamics of 
internal efficiency of the system. Unfortunately the time series necessary for 
this kind of comparisons are not available in this moment.  
 
We calculated the system efficiency in case of voluntary pension funds in 
Hungary in the period of 1994-2002. ( See Table 10 )  
 
Table 10. System Efficiency of Voluntary Pension Funds in Hungary 
  
To evaluate the result, namely that the IRR is equal to 7.22%  is a bit  
difficult. We could take into consideration the average inflation as a minimum 
of required annual rate of return. As in the period of 1995-2002 the average 
inflation weighted by the cumulated net Cash-inflow was 9,4% , we could 
state that the efficiency of the system of voluntary pension funds was not 
satisfactory. It means that the Hungarian Voluntary Pension Fund was a good 
financial vehicle for voluntary pension savings only if the possible tax savings 
were taken into consideration also.   
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Cash in-flow 350 6 611 14 043 25 441 39 789 52 887 58 443 63 998 71 240
Cash outflow  501 552 513 1 414 3 520 5 500 11 589 15 039
Members' claims 351 193
Net CF -350 -6 111 -13 491 -24 928 -38 375 -49 367 -52 943 -52 409 294 992
IRR = 7,22%  29 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
In the first decade of introduction the pension reform Hungary did rather well in this 
big examination.   If we take into consideration that the period of the economic 
transformation was not really favourable for a long term project like pension reform 
and the under-developed capital market gave adverse conditions for developing a 
funded pension system the results could be appreciated.        
 
But the real situation should be improved in several fields as follow: 
 
First,  the interested parties should be educated to learn the self-care conception.  
 
Second, the market competition should have been reconsidered. It should be clear 
that to force building up a funded pension system could be dangerous in 
unfavourable environment. In case when the market prices are not able to fulfil 
their natural role and the market does not control the performances, the pension 
expectations of the private system could be eroded. After a couple years of 
inadequate performances members could hardly be convinced that they could rely 
on this young pension institutions. Especially when they could not find any guaranty 
for the protection of their own interest.    
 
Third,  the public information on performances of the funds would be necessary, as 
members should know about the differences in their final outcome as a result of the 
differences in complex performance of the funds. The internal efficiency could be an 
informative complex measure of performance of the funds.   
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